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To write about the institutional provisiOns of the Treaty of Amsterdam is 
something of a paradox. Although the European Council, meeting in Corfu in 
June 1995, had indicated that the upcoming intergovernmental conference 
(IGC) would have as one of its main tasks the consideration of a series of 
measures "necessary to facilitate the work of the institutions and guaranteee 
their effective operation in the perspective of enlargement", the IGC has 
notoriously failed to agree on the most important issues, such as the 
composition of the Commission or the weighing of Member States' votes in the 
Council of Ministers. At the same time, it is well known that large-scale 
international negotiations are far from representing an inspired exercise in 
constitution-making: the need to reach consensus among all participants 
naturally results in piecemeal compromises which often crystallize around the 
lowest common denominator. The Single European Act, with its heavy 
emphasis on the completion of the internal market, nonetheless contained a 
large number of quid pro quos. 1 This trend was even clearer in the Maastricht 
Treaty, which was rightly described as constructing "a Europe of bits and 
pieces".2 The Treaty of Amsterdam is no exception to the rule: many comments 
have stressed its patchwork nature. 
At the same time, however, when browsing through the various 
institutional provisions scattered throughout the Treaty, two paradigms seem 
particularly relevant to understanding the logic underlying many of the changes 
that have been introduced. Each of these paradigms is characterized by its own 
vision of the missions and of the institutional architecture of the European 
Union (EU). The first, which has been defined as a regulatory modee views 
the Union as a special purpose organization,4 the primary task of which is to 
address a number of issues over which it can hope to achieve greater efficiency 
than the Member States acting individually. In contrast, many people still tend 
to view Europe as a primitive political system, which should gradually evolve 
towards the parliamentary model dominant in European countries. 
While I would submit that most of the institutional changes introduced by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam can be linked to one of these models, it does not 
follow that the IGC should be analysed as a clash between two camps, each 
1 Dehousse, "1992 and Beyond: The Institutional Dimension of the Internal Market Programme", 
( 198911) Legal Issues of European Integration, I 09-136. 
' Curtin, "The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces", 30 C.M.L. Rev. 
(1993) 17-69. See also Jean-Louis Quermonne, "Trois lectures du traite de Maastricht. Essai d'analyse 
comparative", 42 Revuefranr;:aise de science politique (1992) 802-818. 
3 Majone, Regulatinx Europe, London: Routledge (1996). 
4 The expression "special purpose organization" is the most commomly used English translation for 
Ipsen's description of The European Community as a form of Zweckverband, which presents many 
analogies to the regulatory model described here. See the description of this model given in Christian 
Joerges, "European Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty" in Renaud Dehousse 
(ed.), Europe aftr Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? , Munich: Law Books in Europe (1994), 29-62 at 
38-39. 
with its own vision of the Union's institutional future. Those who have followed 
the work of the conference know that this would be too simplistic a view of 
what was essentially a multi-faceted multilateral negotiation, rendered 
extremely complex by the diversity of the participants' agenda. T~e a~s~nce. of 
common objectives has often been signalled as one of the mam di~ficulttes 
faced by the negotiators. This notwithstanding, the two models which have 
been sketched here can be used to disentangle the web of decisions taken at 
Amsterdam. 
The purpose of this article is not to discuss the respective merits of these 
two models, but rather to give an overview of the main changes introduced by 
the new Treaty and to create some order in what might otherwise appear as a 
bundle of uncoordinated decisions. The article is thus organized as follows. Part 
I presents an overview of the main tenets of the two models, traces of which can 
already be found in the pre-Amsterdam institutional architecture. Part II seeks 
to discern more clearly their respective influences over the new treaty. Part III 
then attempts to understand the reasons which may explain the coexistence of 
these two approaches within the treaty and offers a tentative assessment of the 
implications involved in forthcoming enlargements. 
1. Two Blueprints for the Institutional Architecture of the European Union 
Jacques Delors suggested some time ago that there are two dominant schools of 
thought as regards the primary raison d'etre of European integration: those who 
view Europe as an area in which free trade should be organized and those who 
rather regard it as a power in the making.5 This distinction is so broad as to 
leave room for many types of institutional arrangements. However, among the 
many models which have been considered in relation to the IGC,6 two - the 
parliamentary model and the regulatory model, respectively - appear 
particularly useful for an analysis of the Amsterdam Treaty. Again, I should 
stress that what follows are ideal-types, inspired by different perceptions of 
Europe's main mission, rather than clearly articulated projects for its 
institutional development. Arguably, these models may be of some help as a 
heuristic device in order to understand the evolution of the last decade. Yet, it 
does not follow that these are the only models that have actually been 
employed, or that can be conceived of, in reflections on the organization of the 
European society. 
5 L'unite d'un homme, Paris: Odile Jacob ( 1994). 
6 Nentwich and Falkner, "Intergovernmental Conference 1996: Which Constitution for the Union?", 
European Law Journal (1996) 83-102. 
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1.1. The Parliamentary Model 
The parliamentary system is not only the dominant form in Western Europe, it 
also happens to be the standard reference in reflections on the institutional 
architecture of the European Union. I can therefore confine myself here to 
underlining the main reasons which may explain the attempts to transpose it at 
European level. 
Unlike the regulatory model, for which institutional questions are a 
means to achieve certain objectives rather than an end in themselves, the 
parliamentary approach stems from a vision of democratic legitimacy in which 
institutional arrangements are essential. Because of their representative 
character, parliaments are regarded as the repository of a legitimacy capital. 
They must therefore enjoy a decisive say in public policies for the latter to be 
legitimated. As is widely known, the emphasis on the role of parliaments is 
quite strong in the classical definition of the "democratic deficit": the problem 
is said to arise from the fact that many of the competences transferred to the 
European Community are of a legislative nature, which are traditionally the 
prerogative of parliaments at national level. At Community level, however, the 
powers of the European Parliament remain limited. 7 Two additional corrollaries 
of this aproach are also worthy of mention, although they have so far received 
less attention in debates on the European institutions: parliaments are supposed 
to be able to control the operation of the executive, and the executive function 
is presented as the mere implementation of policy decisions taken through the 
legislative process. 
This representative understanding of democracy is so deeply rooted in 
Western European tradition that one tends to consider that it should affect all 
public policies. Thus, those who advocate the tranforrnation of the European 
Union into a continental power, which ought to gradually acquire a range of 
functions similar to those traditionally enjoyed by nation-states, often plead in 
favour of an extension of the rights of the European Parliament in all areas in 
which the Union is active. As is well known, the last two decades have been 
characterized by attempts to inject ever greater doses of parliamentarism into 
the European institutional system. The budgetary debate of the 1970s, the 
growing involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative procedures, 
and last but not least, its role in the appointment of the European Commission 
as defined by the Maastricht Treaty, have been important stages in this 
evolution -- an evolution in which the Treaty of Amsterdam marks an important 
step, as will be seen below. 
7 See the resolution of the European Parliament on the democratic deficit in the European Community of 
17 June 1988, OJ C187/229. 
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In spite of its oft-criticized ambiguity, the generic concept of "political 
union", which is used to describe the objective to be reached in the integration 
process, stresses two important facets of the model. First, the constructiOn of 
Europe, like nation-building, is not intended to be confined to market 
integration, but should also encompass traditional activities of the states. such 
as the provision of welfare and security. Secondly, politics are expected to play 
a greater role on the future European scene than they do today. This is g~nerally 
seen as a positive evolution, as it is expected to bring European instltutwns 
closer to the schemes existing at national level. 
1.2. The Regulatory Model 
The regulatory approach is primarily a functional one: in this view, the 
European Union should concentrate on activities in which it can hope to 
achieve greater efficiency than can the Member States, whether that be because 
of the transborder character of the issues to be dealt with or because states 
acting alone are likely to generate negative externalities for their partners. 
While the emphasis clearly rests on market integration, it should not be thought 
that this confines the European institutions to negative integration, i.e. to the 
removal of obstacles to free trade. 8 After all, the establishment of a single 
market necessarily requires a measure of harmonization in an area that can be 
broadly defined as "risk regulation", namely the assessment and management of 
risks that may result from natural events or human activities.9 Indeed, _the 
development of Community involvement in areas such as environmental pohcy, 
consumer protection or health and safety at work, has been impressive in the 
post Single Act years. However, Europe should not aim to acquire the range of 
powers that have traditionally been associated with the nation-state. 
Giandomenico Majone, the most active theorist of the regulatory model at 
European level, has for instance suggested that European institutions are not 
really equipped to deal with redistributive policies, as the latter are not 
ff. . dri 10 e 1c1ency- ven. 
Although space constraints prevent an extensive treatment of the 
theroretical underpinnings of this approach here, it is essential for our purposes 
to understand that this vision of the Union's main mission has a number of 
institutional corollaries. 11 The first of these is that there should be a clear 
division of labour between the Member States and the European Union. 
Secondly, risk regulation tends to ignore lawyers' basic distinction between 
legislative decisions and implementing rules. By its very nature, risk regulation 
8 Pinder, "Positive Integration and Negative Integration - Some Problems of Economic Integration in the 
EEC", 24 The World Today (1968) 88-110. 
9 Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle. Towards Effecive Risk Regulation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press (1993). 
10 Majone, Regulating Europe, London: Routledge (1996) 296-300. 
11 Caporaso, "The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modem?", 
Journal of Common Market Studies (1996) 29-34. 
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requires complex risk assessments. which cannot be performed ex ante through 
legislative instruments: implementmg a~enctes are ?ften granted a rmx of rule-
making and implementation powers. Thirdly, pure mtergovemmental solutwns 
are viewed as providing often inadequate responses to the problems that have to 
be tackled at European level. National regulators may lack adequate knowledge 
of the behaviour of the regulated, particularly when the latter h_appen to be 
located in other countries; they may also be tempted to use their r~g~Jatory 
capacity strategically to favour domestic firms. As a result, the1r credibility as 
enforcers of European policies tends to be poor. The re~ulatory ~od_el there~ore 
Jays considerable emphasis on delegation to supranatwnal mstltutwns which, 
because of the autonomy they enjoy, are assumed to be less p:one to capture by 
specific interests and can therefore be expected to be stncter m enforcmg 
regulatory standards throughout the Union. 1 
However, supranational agencies (be it the Comrni~sion or ~ut~nomous 
administrative agencies) can only fulfil such a ro~e _If their mstltutwnal 
autonomy is preserved. While it is clear that th~ C?mrmsswn cannot and ~~ould 
not operate in a political vacuum, its cr~dibihty IS dependent on Its ab~hty to 
remain immune to interference from natwnal governments or party pohtJcs m 
its daily activities. Where its autonomy is in doubt, pres_sures to curtail its 
powers are likely to follow: _the German proposal to estabhsh ~uropean cartel 
office, for instance, was motivated by the fact that the Comrmsswn appea~ed to 
be too exposed to "political" pressures. 13 The regulatory model th~refore fmds a 
much more favourable environment in Madisonian systems, which emphasize 
the need for a system of institutional checks and balances in order to disperse 
power. Indeed, the concentration of power in a few hands - "whet~er,of8ne, a 
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or electJ_ve . - IS 
perceived as the worst evil Transposed to European level_, this approach 
suggests that legislative mandates and budgetary controls, while performm~ a 
most useful function of democratic control, should not transform relatiOnships 
between the Commission and other institutions (in particular, the European 
Parliament) into a purely principal-agent relationship. 
Lastly, it follows from these premises that the legitima~y of European 
public policies must be ensured by resorting to t_echmques whiCh enJ<?Y. a less 
prominent role in domestic political systems. While there may be proviSions to 
ensure a degree of representativeness to each institution, the autonomy each of 
them is supposed to enjoy prevents the emergence of a model of representa~Ive 
democracy similar to those prevailing in Western European countnes. 
Legitimacy must therefore flow from other sources. Clear mandates must set 
12 Gatsios and Seabright, "Regulation in the European Community", 5 Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, (1989) 37-60. 
13 See the comments of Dieter Wolf, President of the Bundeskartellam, in Ehlennann and Laudati (eds), 
Robert Schuman Centre Annual on European Competition Law 1996, The Hague: Kluwer (1997) at 8-
ll. 
14 The Federalist Papers, N. 47 (James Madison), ed. By Gary Wils, New York. Bantain (1982) at 244. 
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out? possibly at constitutional level, the objectives to be reached (price stability. 
a htgh level of health and consumer protection, etc.). Supranational institutions 
are held accountable for the progress achieved in pursuing these objectives. 
Pro~e?ures are equally important: decision-making processes must be 
sufficiently transparent in order to allow representatives of the various 
interested parties to express themselves. 15 
Coined in such abstract terms, the regulatory model might seem far away 
from today's realities. Yet this impression largely stems from the fact that the 
public (an~ academic) discourse on European institutions is heavily influenced 
by the parliamentary model. In fact, several aspects of the existina institutional 
structure seem fairly close to central concerns of the regulatory m;del. From the 
outset, the emphasis has been laid on functional integration in a limited number 
of areas in which "de facto solidarity" could be achieved, according to the 
preamble of the Treaty of Paris. The founding fathers' emphasis on the 
autonomy of the Commission and the important institutional prerogatives 
granted to the latter need not be recalled for the readers of this review. Since the 
Single European ~ct, Euro~ean_ in~erventions in the realm of risk regulation 
hav~ grown steadily. The mstltutwnal aspects of monetary union, and in 
particular, t~e ~ut~nomy W~nted to the future European central bank, clearly 
rest on an mstttutwnal visiOn which owes more to the regulatory approach 
dev~loped a?ov~ tha~ to the canons of parliamentary democracy -- hence the 
mamfold obJeCtiOns It has encountered in various countries. As can be seen 
while the theorization_ of the r~gu_l~tory model may sound new, it encompasses~ 
number of aspects which are ramihar to observers of the European scene. 
The differences between the regulatory and parliamentary models largely 
~o~ ~rom their. respective premises. The regulatory model approaches 
mstltutwnal questiOns f~om a functional angle, while the parliamentary model 
starts from the assumptiOn that more democracy should be injected into the 
European process. This notwithstanding, it is clear that both models have had a 
strong influence over the institutional development of the European Union. The 
Treaty of Amsterdam is no exception to the rule, as we shall now see. 
15 Majone, supra note 5 at 291-96. 
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2. The Amsterdam Treaty 
2.1. Towards a Parliamentary Model? 
2.1.1. Parliament as a Co-legislator 
The European Parliament is largely viewed as the institution that has most 
benefited from the Treaty of Amsterdam: Elmar Brok MEP, a Parliament 
representative at the IGC, summarized the dominant view when he suggested 
that 'if there is one winner in the Amsterdam Treaty, then it is the European 
Parliament' .16 
The Parliament's posttlon has been redressed in several respects. Its 
legislative powers have been greatly extended. Legislative co-decision has been 
foreseen in eight new provisions, including in areas which have recently 
acquired political salience, such as social policy17 and public health. 18 Even 
more significant is the fact that a shift to co-decision was introduced in 15 
existing provisions, mainly in replacement of the cooperation procedure which 
will henceforth be confined to monetary policy. The provisions in questions 
cover decisions in areas such as the free movement of workers, 19 the freedom of 
bl . h 20 1' 21 h 22 d . 1. . 23 c esta IS ment, transport po Icy, researc an environment po tctes. o-
decision therefore emerges as the most frequently used legislative procedure. 
The result is surprising if one recalls how much disagreement was voiced over 
the scope of the co-decision procedure at the time the Maastricht Treaty was 
being negotiated -- only six years ago. Moreover, throughout the IGC, several 
delegations had made no secret of their opposition to an extension of the 
Parliament's legislative prerogatives. Apparently, this did not suffice to stop the 
supporters of the parliamentary model - which suggests that it is wrong to 
assume that in complex negotiations upholders of the status quo always prevail. 
The change must be analysed in connection with the simplification of the 
co-decision procedure decided in Amsterdam. Article 189b has become shorter, 
less complex, and therefore easier to understand. At the same time, the balance 
of power has been shifted in favour of the European Parliament. Some of the 
changes are of a symbolic nature: when a conciliation committee is convened it 
must focus on the amendments put forward by the Parliament; the latter is no 
longer required to inform the Council when it intends to reject the Council's 
common position. More significantly, the so-called "third reading", which was 
16 European Policy Centre (ed.) Making Sense of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) at 45. 
17 Articles 118(2) and 119. 
18 Article 129(4). 
19 Article 49. 
20 Articles 54(2) and 56(2). 
21 Articles 75(1) and 84. 
22 Article 130. 
23 Article 130s(l). 
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perceived by Parliament as a symbol of its subordinate role in legislative 
procedures, has been abolished. Under the Maastricht system, when the 
conciliation committee failed to agree on a compromise text, the Council still 
had the option to "confirm its common position" by a qualified majority 
decision. All Parliament could then do was to reject this common position, a 
decision which required an absolute majority of its component members. Only a 
few months after the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty the Parliament 
showed that this was no insurmontable obstacle if it could flex its muscles, as it 
did in relation to the proposed directive on voice telephony, which it rejected. 
However, many MEPs feared the negative side of the weapon: in the event that 
the Parliament should reject a text, it could easily be held responsible for the 
failure of the legislative procedure. Moreover, given the requirement of a 
majority of members of Parliament for the rejection of the common position, it 
could not be thought that this threat would always be sufficient to encourage 
the Council to be cooperative in the conciliation committee. The revision has 
addressed that difficulty by changing the default condition: in case of failure to 
reach agreement, 'the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted'. 
Combined together, the simplification and the extension of the co-
decision procedure certainly improve the overall position of the European 
Parliament. Parliament has also seen its standing improved in Pillars II and III. 
It must now be consulted in relation to the various kinds of normative measures 
to be adopted in the areas that remain in the third pillar, i.e. police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Moreover, Article 118(2) has put an end to a 
bitter dispute over the operational expenditures incurred as a result of decisions 
taken in the framework of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) by 
providing that most of these expenditures should be charged to the Community 
budget, .;vhich will consolidate parliamentary control over foreign policy 
matters.2 
2.1.2. A Bicameral Legislature? 
Put together, these developments clearly suggest that parliamentary influence 
over a wide range f matters should grow significantly in the years to come. 
From the Parliament's standpoint, the Amsterdam harvest is more impressive 
than the previous ones. The Single European Act had inaugurated the 
legislative dialogue through the establishment of the cooperation procedure; the 
Maastricht treaty had marked Parliament's accession to the role of co-legislator 
with the introduction of the co-decision procedure. The Amsterdam Treaty has 
gone a step further along the same path both in qualitative terms, by putting the 
Parliament and the Council on an equal footing in the co-decision procedure, 
and in quantitative terms, with the extension of this procedure to a significant 
number of new areas. 
24 See F. Dehousse "Les n!sultats de Ia conference intergouvemementale", Courrier hebdomadaire du 
CRISP (1997) Wl565-66 at 39-40 for a more detailed analysis. 
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Seen in historical perpective, the process is impressive in its continuity. 
In little more than ten years, the Parliament has moved from the status of a 
consultative assembly to that of a fully-fledged legislative body. To be sure, the 
process is not yet complete: the pillar structure of the Union, which has been 
left untouched (in principle, if not in substance, given the transfer of some 
matters from the third to the first pillar) in Amsterdam, still holds a number of 
barriers against parliamentary influence, and there continue to be a number of 
areas in which the Parliament remains -- formally at least -- confined to a 
subordinate role: it is merely consulted in agricultural policl5 and tax 
harmonization,26 while its consultation is still not formally provided for the 
common commercial policy. Notwithstanding these black holes, and in view of 
the evolution of the last decade, it does not seem excessive to argue that the 
institutional system is now close to that of a number of federal systems, in 
which the legislative power is shared by two branches representing the 
population of the Union and its Member States, respectively.17 
This option in favour of a bicameral legislature has been reinforced --
admittedly in an implicit fashion -- by the Protocol on the role of national 
parliaments in the European Union, which was approved in Amsterdam. It will 
be recalled that the early 1990s saw a real upsurge of interest in the role of 
national parliaments in the integration process. The phenomenon was not 
limited to academic circles: in its ruling on the Maastricht treaty, the German 
Constitutional Court stressed that, given the underdeveloped character of the 
European political process, national parliaments were key providers of 
legitimacy: 
Democratic legitimacy in the Union of States constituting the European Union is 
necessarily conferred by feedback from the actions of the European institutions in the 
parliaments of the Member States28 
Building on that trend, some institutionalization of the role of national 
parliaments had been advocated in various circles. Some went as far as to 
suggest the creation at European level of an assembly composed of 
representatives of national parliaments, which would be given a say in the 
E I . I . ~ uropean egis at1ve process. For its part, the French government had 
25 Article 43. 
26 Article 99. 
27 For a reflexion on this model, see Lenaerts and Snijder, "The Question of Democratic Representation: 
On the Democratic Representation through the European Parliament, the Council, the Committee of 
Regions, the Economic and Social Committee and the National Parliaments", in J.A. Winter et al (eds) 
Reforming The Treaty on European Union- The Legal Debate, The Hague: Kluwer (1996) 173-97. 
28 Cases Nos 2 BvR 2134 and 2159/92; judgment of 12 October 1993, reprinted in Oppenheimer (ed.) 
The Relationship between European Community Law and National Law: The Cases, Cambridge 
University Press (1994) 525 at 554. 
29 A proposal for a European Constitution, Report by the European Constitutional Group, December 
1993. 
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advocated the establishment of a similarly composed High Consultative 
Council to advise the Commission on the proper use of the subsidiarity 
principle. 
None of these proposals met with much interest during the negotiations. 
The reflection group which prepared the intergovernmental conference 
unambiguously rejected the creation of a permanent organ with its own staff 
and premises as well as what it has called "a second chamber" comprismg 
members of national parliaments,30 stressing instead that the primary role of 
national parliaments in relation to European decision-making "lies in ~he 
monitoring and control that each parliament exerts over its government's actwn 
in the Coucil" and that it is up to each state, and not to the Union, to regulate 
these powers.31 
The Amsterdam Protocol fully endorsed this view. While it pays lip 
service to the need to enable national parliaments to express their views on 
European matters, it essentially limits itself to providing that they should be 
forwarded all Commission consultation documents (green and white papers as 
well as communications) and that draft legislative proposals should be made 
available by their government "as appropriate".32 In addition, a minimum of six 
weeks must elapse between the time that draft legislative proposals are made 
available and a possible decision by the Council. 
Similarly, while the protocol generously invites the conference of 
European affairs committees -- the so-called COSAC, which brings together 
representatives of the organs responsible for European affairs in national 
parliaments and a small delegation of the European Parliament-- to make "any 
contribution it deems appropriate" to European institutions, it deliberately 
avoids any reference to the more ambitious "Assizes" model. This latter 
foresees a meeting of large delegations of members of the European Parliament 
and of national parliaments, along the lines of the meeting that took place in 
Rome in November 1990. Although that model has been at times presented as a 
means of injecting further legitimacr into the European system, the proposal 
was rejected by the reflection group.3 
Thus, as regards national parliaments, the most important innovation 
does not appear in the relevant protocol, but rather in the new Article 151 (3 ), 
according to which "when the Council acts in its legislative capacity, the results 
of votes and explanations of vote as well as statements in the minutes shall be 
made public." 
While a milder version of this principle already appeared in the Council's 
30 Reflection Group's report, 5 December 1995, at para. 93 and 95. 
31 lbid. at para. 91. 
32 Articles I and 2. 
33 Supra note 25 at para. 93. 
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rules of procedure,34 its effect was mitigated by far-reaching exceptions, 
particularly as regards explanations of votes which could only be made public 
through an ad hoc decision of the Council. 35 The consolidation of the principle 
is of course important for national parliaments, which will now be in a better 
position to scrutinize the behaviour of their government's representative in the 
Council - at least in those cases where a formal vote is taken. 
To sum up, it appears that the drafters of the treaty have not departed 
from the two-tiered deliberative process advocated by the German 
Constitutional Court. The role of national parliaments remains essentially 
indirect. They may attempt to influence the behaviour of European institutions, 
but they have been denied any direct invovement in the legislative procedures. 
The future will tell whether the Amsterdam Treaty has been the high water 
mark as regards their influence in ordinary European decision-making 
processes. Given the role they play in the ratification process, it might be 
premature to count them out. What is evident, however, is that the Maastricht 
blueprint is characterized by a clear rejection of a number of elaborate models 
that had been proposed, and by a further step -- a drift, some might argue --
towards a federal-type bicameral legislature. 
2.1. 3. Parliament and Commission 
The relationships between the legislature and the executive are the cornerstone 
of the parliamentary system: as parliaments are regarded as the main providers 
of legitimacy, executive authority must derive from, and be responsible to, the 
legislature. In this view, government responsibility before parliament is 
essential, as it allows voters to dismiss rulers with whom they are dissatisfied. 
Although the European Commission has only been endowed with limited 
implementation powers, it fulfils many functions traditionally allocated to the 
government machinery in contemporary systems: policy impulsion, drafting of 
legislation, monitoring of its implementation, etc. Relationships between the 
Parliament and the Commission are therefore of central importance in 
understanding the kind of institutional system which is likely to emerge as a 
result of the changes operated in the last decade. 
The Maastricht Treaty had already made major steps towards a kind of 
parliamentary governement. 36 In this treaty provision was made for the 
Parliament to be consulted on the choice of person that governments of the 
Member States intended to appoint as President. A "vote of approval" was 
required before the appointment of the whole Commission could be formalized. 
34 Article 7(5). 
35 Article 5 (1). See also the comments in section 2.2.2. 
36 See Article 158 and the comments of Noel, "A New Institutional Balance", in Dehousse (ed.) Europe 
after Maastricht, supra note 4 at 20-21. 
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Finally, the Commission's term of office was made .to coincide with that of 
Parliament, confirming that the drafters of that treaty mtended the votes cast m 
European elections to be reflected in the choice of a new Commission. Some of 
these elements simply codified established practices: the Stuttgart DeclaratiOn 
of 1983 already provided for consultation with the Parliament's enlarged bureau 
on the choice of President, votes of confidence had already taken place in the 
past and, in 1989 and 1993, the Commission waited until this vote before it 
taking its oath of office. 
Yet, beside its symbolic value, the "constitutionalization" of these 
procedures has clearly reinforced the Parliament's hand: the fact. that it c~n 
withhold its "approval" at the end of the procedure clearly remforces Its 
position in the early stages. Even though it would be legally posssible to ignore 
objections to the national governments' choice for the Commission Presidency, 
a Commission chaired by a person about whom Parliament had expressed an 
unfavourable opinion would be unlikely to secure a majority at the time of the 
"vote of approval". Likewise, the Parliament has relied on the approval 
requirement to convince members of the Santer Commission -- who were 
initially reluctant -- to participate in "confirmation hearings" before the 
appropriate parliamentary committees (a procedure which proved to be 
notoriously difficult for some of them). 
These innovations have undoubtedly transformed the quality of the 
relationship between Parliament and the Commission. As suggested by Emile 
Noel, the vote of approval has something of the character of an election and it 
confers a higher political profile on the Commission.37 This view seems to be 
shared by Mr Santer, who has stressed that in the post-Maastricht context "Ia 
Commission peut se vanter d'une legitimite democratique et parlementaire. "38 
Further, Parliament's role in the appointment procedure has given added 
credibility to the threat of a censure vote, which has reinforced its control over 
the daily activities of the Commission. As a result, Parliamentary influence has 
considerably increased, including in legislative procedures which had been 
previously characterized by a Commission-Council dialogue. 39 
This evolution is likely to be further accentuated as a result of the few 
changes introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 158(2) now requires the 
nomination of the "President designate" to be approved by the European 
Parliament. As has been indicated, this simply aligns the text of the treaty on 
the new balance of power in the post-Maastricht appointment procedure. In July 
1994, when the nomination of Jacques Santer appeared to be in doubt following 
the United Kingdom's veto of Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, Mr 
37 Supra note 31 at 21. 
38 Le Monde, 20 janvier 1995. 
39 See Dehousse, "The Legacy of Maastricht: Emerging Institutional Issues", Collected Courses of the 
Academy of European Law, vol. ill, Book I, The Hague: Kluwer (1992) 181-239 at 226-28 for a more 
detailed analysis. 
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Santer made it clear that he would withdraw if he failed to rally the supp~rt of a 
majority of MEPs, thereby indicating that he regarded t~e c~nsultat10n of 
Parliament as tantamount to a confirmation vote. The modt.ficat·IO·n of Article 
158(2) must therefore be viewed as a confirmation of an (tmphcit) OJ?tiOn m 
favour of a parliamentary system, rather than as a change m the appomtment 
procedure. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the nature of the debate on Mr Santer in July 1994, following his statement to the 
House, and the meetings he held with the three largest Political Groups, illustrated the 
character of the procedure as one of building-up a parliamentary majority for the 
confirmation vote.40 
The only novel element introduced at that level regards the position of the 
President vis-a-vis his fellow commissioners. The Treaty of Amsterdam now 
foresees that in explict terms that "[t]he Commission shall work under the 
political guidance of its President" .41 A declaration included in the Final Act of 
the conference has confirmed the principle by indicating that 
[The Conference] considers that the President of the Commission must enjoy broad 
discretion in the allocation of tasks within the College, as well as in any reshuffling of 
those tasks during a Commission's term of office. 
This suggests a determined will to confer upon the President, primus inter 
pares, a clearer authority than in the past over the members of the exe~utive. 
Although the vagueness of these provisions has been seen as a sign of 
weakness,42 they have to be read in conjunction with the secon~ para¥raph of 
Article 158 (2), according to which the members of the CommissiOn will m the 
future be appointed by "the governments of the Member States ... b~ common 
accord with the nominee for President". This may give some bite to the 
otherwise vague statements quoted here. The Pres.ident's authority ov~r the 
Commission may be significantly reinforced by his enhanced .status m the 
appointment procedure. Although he has not be~n granted dtsc~plm.ar~ P?Wers, 
the threat of a non-renewal may help him to Impose a certam discipline on 
unruly colleagues, which was not always possible in the past. It can therefore be 
argued that the Amsterdam Treaty has made a further step. in the direc~ion of 
those parliamentary models in which the head of the executive IS recogmzed as 
a special authority over the cabinet. 
40 Corbett et al., The European Parliament, 3d. ed. London: Catermill (1995) at 248. 
41 Article 163, first paragraph. 
42 See European Policy Centre (ed.), Making Sense of the Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 16 at 108. 
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2.2. The EC as a Regulatory Structure 
The above elements might lead one to believ~ that a clearcut choice has been 
made in favour of the parliamentary model. Tht_s, however, nnght be too raptd a 
conclusion for the Amsterdam Treaty has also mtroduced a senes of changes --
the extensi~n of the Community competences in the field of social regulatiOn, 
the new provisions on transparency or the subsidiarity protocol -- which rather 
bring the EC closer to the regulatory model discusssed in the first part of this 
article. Admittedly, at first glance, these elements might appear as neutral fr?m 
the institutional standpoint, in that they do not openly_ reflect a particular visiOn 
of the Union's institutional architecture. Yet, the kind of 1ssues they try to 
address, and the approach which has been chosen, are clearly evocative of some 
kind of regulatory model, as we shall now see. 
2.2.1. The Development of Risk Regulation 
The development of EC competence to deal with risk regulation is one of the 
most surprising aspects of the Amsterdam Treaty. The mam purpose_ ofthe I GC 
was to review the functioning of Pillars II and III and to discuss the mstitutwnal 
changes that might be necessary to prepare for the forthconnng enlargements. 
No one expected real changes in the missions of t~e. European Com~umty. 
Given the post-Maastricht enthusiasm for the subs1d1anty pnnc1ple, 1t was 
widely acknowledged that a further expansion o~ EC_ competences was 
undesirable. However, the BSE scare and the dysfunctwns 1t revealed opened a 
window of opportunity for the Commission. I_t thus decided to table a series of 
amendments aiming at enlarging the legal basis for Community mterventwns m 
the field of public health and consumer protection. 
Some of the changes that were agreed upon are of a cosmetic nature. 
Thus, the primary ambition of Community health policy is no longer mere!~ to 
"contribute to ensure a high level of human health protectiOn by encouragmg 
the co-operation between Member States"43 but to ensure "a high level of 
human health protection in the definition and implementation of Comn_mmty 
policies".44 The Community is also invited to play a more active role m the 
protection of consum~rs: it must now pr?mote their right to information and to 
organize themselves, 5 as well as momtor 4~an~ no longer Simply assist) the policies pursued by the Mem?er States. . Likewise, consumer protewon 
requirements must now be taken mto account m other Commumty policies. 
43 Maastricht version of Article 128. 
44 New Article 129. 
45 Article !29a(l). 
46 Article 129a(3 )(b). 
47 New Article 129a. 
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Although the direct impact of such amendments is likely to be limited,4~ 
they bear evidence of a greater willingness on the part of national governments 
to accept that the Community has an autonomous role to play in the areas at 
issue. More importantly, several elements are likely to give additional clout to 
Community interventions. First, the Maastricht Treaty clause that prevented the 
Community from adopting harmonization measures in the field of public 
health49 has been removed. Secondly, the role of the European Parliament has 
been enhanced by the shift to co-decision in public health and environmental 
policies. 5° This will also apply to adoption of health measures in the veterinary 
and phytosanitary sectors, in which the rights of the European Parliament have 
traditionally been limited, as they formed part of agricultural policy. This 
Parliament's new powers might well result in a stronger European presence in 
theses fields: MEPs have often advocated a pro-active stance in these policy 
areas, which are of interest to the overall European populace. 
As had already been the case with the Single Act, the prospect of a 
Europeanization of risk regulation has been met with some concern by states 
which have already developped regulatory policies. They fear that the need to 
reach a consensus might lead to a lowering of their standards of protection. This 
has led to the mushrooming of statements exhorting, in a somewhat redundant 
fashion, the Community to ensure "a high level of protection" in its regulatory 
policies. In addition, it has been ·felt necessary to enlarge the scope of the 
safeguard clause contained in Article lOOa, by allowing Member States to 
introduce new provisions to protect the environment or the working 
environment (but, oddly enough, not public health or consumers). The measures 
in question must be duly motivated and approved by the Commission,51 whose 
role as an umpire in interstate relations is thereby implicitly confirmed. The 
impact of such escape clauses is difficult to assess: although they were largely 
perceived as a threat for the unity of the European market at the time of the 
Single Act, 52 it could actually be argued that the possibility of opting out is one 
of the elements that has enabled states with a high level of protection to drive 
up the European regulatory standards in a number of areas. 53 Interestingly, 
Article lOOa (7) states that when national provisions derogating from 
48 See e.g. case c-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, judgment of 13 May 1997, not 'yet 
reported, where in response to a claim that Community directive 94/19/EC was incompatible with the 
Community's objective to attain a high level of consumer protection, the Court of Justice indicated that 
"although consumer protection is one of the objectives of the Community, it is clearly not the sole 
objective". It further stressed that "no provision of the Treaty obliges the Community legislature to adopt 
the highest level of protection which can be found in a particular Member State" (at recital48). 
49 Article 129(4). 
50 New Article 130s(l). 
51 Article 100a(4) to (9). On the need for the Commission to motivate its own decision, on national 
measures, see case C-41193, France, v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-1829. 
52 See Pescatore, "Some Critical Remarks on the Single European Act", Common Market Law Review 
(1987) (24) 9 for a notable example. 
53 Sbragia, "Environmental Policy", in Wallace and Wallace (eds), Policy Making in the European 
Union, Oxford University Press ( 1996) 235-55. 
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harmonization measures are approved by the Commission, the latter must 
examine whether to propose an adaptation to that measure. This in itself can be 
seen as an implicit confirmation that the derogation clause may have a pro-
regulation impact. Why this is so can be easily explained: if the "grounds of 
major need" or the scientific evidence justifying a derogation are sound, they 
might as well lead to a stricter Community provision. 
Be that as it may, the combination of changes introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty clearly suggests that national governments were eager to 
develop risk regulation at European level. How exactly this will be achieved 
has not been specified. Yet, by its very nature, risk regulation requires complex 
decisions which cannot be taken in abstracto by way of legislative instruments. 
Laws may require pharmaceuticals to be safe, and foodstuffs healthy; they may 
even lay down in great detail procedures governing the way in which risks 
related to these goods must be assessed. Ultimately, however, the decision on 
whether they may be marketed will be taken by bureaucratic structur~s, having 
regard inter alia to the available scientific evidence - a requirement which is 
now explicitly acknowledged in several treaty provisions.54 Moreover, several 
innovations contained in the Treaty, such as the provisions on transparency or 
the subsidiarity protocol can be viewed as attempts to bypass the parliamentary 
model that has so far dominated in reflexions on the future institutional 
structure of the Union, as shall now be seen. 
2.2.2. Transparency 
The transparency of public policy-making is by no means a problem peculiar to 
European institutions. On the contrary "Government in the Sunshine" is a 
standard problem of contemporary governance. The multiplicity of functions 
assigned to state machineries in the twentieth century has led to the 
development of large bureaucratic structures, often quite opaque, and which 
appear not to be actually accountable to anyone. Hence the growing pressures 
to improve the openness of decision-making processes. 
While there has been an upsurge of interest in the transparency issue at 
European level, there has been little acknowledgement that a proper treatment 
of the problem requires a new paradigm of democratic legitimacy.55 It can 
indeed be argued that the emergence of the issue is largely due to a crisis of 
representative democracy: if parliaments were able to effectively control the 
54 See e.g. Article 100a(3) and (5) and Joerges, Ladeur and Vos (eds) Integrating Sientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making, Baden-Baden: Nomos (1997). 
55 See however Craig, "Democracy and Rule-Making within the EC: An Empirical and Nonnative 
Assessment", 3 European Law Joumal (1997) 105-130; Curtin, Postnational Democracy - The 
European Union in Search of a Political Philosophy, Universiteit Utrecht (1997); Weiler et al. 
"European Democracy and its Critique" in J.Hayward (ed.) The Crisis of Representationin Westem 
Europe, London: Sage (1995) 4-39. 
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workings of bureaucracies and could act as a forum in which the diverse 
interests in a given polity could be voiced, the problem would lose much of its 
acuteness. Typically, the techniques that have been used at national level to 
come to grips with the growth of the bureaucratic state -- provisions on access 
to official documents and participation in administrative practices -- were 
somehow conceived as a way to compensate for the fact that parliaments face 
growing difficulties in overseeing the activities of the administration. 
Moreover, specific features of the Community system render parliamentary of 
bureaucratic networks more difficult than at national level. Even though the 
European Parliament's power over the Commission has been considerably 
enhanced by the Maastricht Treaty, it largely remains an outsider in comitology 
networks, the role and the importance of which is now increasingly 
acknowledged. This explains why the comitology debate, which was largely fed 
by the Commission in the 1980s, has now become a bone of contention between 
the Parliament and the Council.56 At the same time, the European Parliament 
has not (yet?) emerged as a forum in which political debate on important social 
issues can be developed. 57 
Seen in this light, the pressures in favour of greater transparency appear 
to a large part due to an implicit, but nonetheless quite real, scepticism as to the 
ability of citizens to acquire real influence via the medium of representative 
democracy. The Commission's undertaking to consult widely before tabling 
legislative proposals58 is symptomatic of a willingness to reach out to a broader 
constituency. Undoubtedly, there are additional facets to the transparency 
problem. Decision-making procedures are so complex that they are largely 
unintelligible to a lay audience. Likewise, as indicated above, the publicity of 
voting records may be viewed as a way of holding national delegations 
accountable before their respective parliaments for their actions within the 
Council of Ministers. But it nevertheless remains difficult to connect these 
questions to the classical concept of representative democracy. 
In contrast, the bridges with the regulatory model are manifold. As it lays 
the emphasis on the autonomy of regulatory agencies, that model assumes a 
considerable degree of separation of powers: legislatures lay down the 
legislative framework within which agencies have to operate, and they check 
whether the objectives and guidelines that have been set for agency action have 
actually been respected, but they are not supposed to monitor agencies' day-to-
day activities, save in exceptional circumstances.59 The quest for alternative 
sources of legitimacy has led advocates of the regulatory model to recognize 
56 Bradley "The European Parliament and Comitology: on the Road to Nowhere?", 3 European Law 
Jouma/ (1997) 230-57. 
57 See my "Constitutional Reform in the European Community: Are there Alternatives to the 
Majoritarian Avenue?", West European Politics (1995) 118-136, for a more extensive analysis. 
58 
"Interinstitutional Declaration on Democracy, Transparency and Subsidiarity", reproduced in Europe 
documents n' 1857 of 4 November 1993 at 2. 
59 Section 1.2. 
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that the huge variety of interests affected by public policies must somehow be 
reflected in decision-making processes in order to avoid the "capture" of 
regulators by the most powerful interests.60 In such a context, access to 
documents held by decision-makers and the transparency of decision-making 
procedures are obviously of great importance. The steps made in that direction 
therefore appear related to a vision of legitimacy which is closer to the 
regulatory model than to the hitherto dominant parliamentary approach. 
This seems worthy of note as a number of significant changes have been 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, a 
principle of secrecy prevailed in relation to European institutions, with the sole 
exception of the European Parliament. Their meetings were regarded as 
confidential, as was a substantial portion of their documents, both the 
preparatory materials and minutes of the meeetings. 61 While this principle was 
hardly challenged as regards the Court of Justice, where it is perceived as a 
guarantee against undue pressure on judges, the secrecy surrounding the 
proceedings of the Council and the Commission have become a matter of 
concern in recent years, especially given the central role they play in legislative 
procedures. 
As a result, some progress towards greater openness has been achieved in 
the post-Maastricht period as part of a package aimed to improve the public 
perception of European institutions. A declaration attached to the Maastricht 
Treaty, which laid down in general terms the principle of access to information, 
was given effect through a Code of Conduct concerning public access to 
Council and Commission documents.62 These non-binding documents were 
then supplemented by unilateral decisions of the two institutions. The Council 
has amended its Rules of Procedure to provide for a (limited) number of public 
debates, which can be subjected to "retransmission by audiovisual means", 63 
and to allow some access to records64 and explanations of votes.65 Both the 
Council and the Commission have adopted a decision laying down the 
procedural rules to be followed in dealing with applications for documents. 66 
However, the scope of these innovations was more symbolic than real: 
far from creating a subjective right to information, which could be judicially 
enforced, they largely left untouched the principle of confidentiality, as far-
60 See e.g. Sunstein, "Factions, Self-Interest, and the AP A: Four Lessons since 1946", Virginia Law 
Review, vol. 72, 1986, 271-296. 
61 See Article 32 of the Statute of the European Court of justice, Article 5(1) of the Council's Rules of 
Procedure and Article 7 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. 
62 OJL1993, 340/41. 
63 Article 6(2). 
64 Article 7(5). 
65 Article 5(1). 
66 Council decision 931731/EC of 20 December 1993 OJ L 340/43, Commission decision 94/90/ECSC, 
EC, Euratom of 8 February 1994, OJ L 46/58. 
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~ea~hi~g e~ceptions motivated by the protection of the " . . " 
mstttutwns mterest in the confidentialit f h . public Interest or the 
Moreove.r, both institutions appear t;; ~a~e ei~oroceedmgs .w~re allowed. 67 ~ystematica~ly denying access to documents w . lo"':ed a surular practice, I~temal deliberations. This latter practice ha b hich rrught reveal the tenor of 
FlfSt Instance. The Court has re uired an . ~ . een conde~ed by the Court of 
which the alleged public intereit ·ustif . mdivid.ual.exarrunatwn of requests, in 
be ~alanced against the applica~t's . ytmg a ~eJectw~ of the .application ~ust 
detailed statement of reasons must al mberest .m. gettmg the mformation. 68 A 
. t d 69 H so e given m the event th t ' reJec e . ow ever as the Co rt d. d a ti1e request is r~quir~ments, decisions on wh~the/ t not go further than these "due process" 
discretiOnary. 0 grant access appear to remain largely 
Viewed against this background th T nu~ber of substantial innovations First! ~ reat~ of ~msterdam contains a 
a nght of access to Europea.n p yl~ It establishes m unambiguous terms 
d 7o . ar 1ament Council d c . . o~ur_nents. While the "principles and condidon " d.an Offi!DJSSIOn ~Ig t IS to be exercised remain to be defined 71 h f s acc~r mg to Which this 
m th~ Treaty is bound to condition th . ' t .e ~ct that It h~ ?ee~ enshrined 
reachmg exceptions should no Ion er b eir a~twn. t~e multiphcatwn of far-
purpose of the Treaty amendment. 1ltho~ p~ssib.le as It would d~feat .the very 
terms that each institution must " 1 b g ~ti~le 19la(3) provides m vague T . . e a orate m Its own 1 f 
speci Jc provisiOns regarding access to it d " . ru es o procedures 
as opening the door to many tn. ~ ocume.nts , this should not be seen 
· . res ctwns Bemg m 1 f . orgamzatwn, rules of procedure cannot d . . er~ ~ es o mternal ~he Community legislature in implement riatef from the prm~Iples adopted by 
Its vagueness, this provision appears t a IOn oh Treaty. proviSIOns. 72 In spite of 
to documents rather than d . ~ cover t e practical modalities of access 
· ' ecJswns of · · 1 
rrusunderstanding in this res ect T pnncip e. To avoid any 
according to which when th! C ' ~faty s~atus has been granted to the rule 
of votes, explanati;ns of vote ano~~~\ acts Ill a legislative capacity, the results 
made public.73 In other words as re a ~ments attached to the minutes are to be 
valu~s established in the post~Maast~~h: a~~e~ to documents, the hierarchy of 
pubhc access has become the rule a d o . app~ar~ to have been reversed: 
mterpreted narrowly. ' n conftdentiahty an exception to be 
67 s 
ee the exceptions listed in the Code of d 
Ec con uct, as well as Art· 1 4 (2) f . 
6, · tc e o Counctl decision 931731 
Case T-194/94 John Ca 1 u1 G d' 
6o Case T-105/9S, WWF rvCe w. . uar tan v. Council, [1995] ECR II-2765. 
10 - • v. ommtsswn judgment f 5 M h New Article 191 a ' 0 arc 1997, not yet reported. 71 . 
The Treaty contemplates a decision b the Counc. . . . ~ectswn procedure. y tl and the Parliament m accordance with the co-
- See case C-58/94 N th 1 d . 
" . ' e eran sv. Cowzctl. [1996]ECRI-2186 
Arttcle 151(3). See above, section 2.1.2. . 
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This no_twiths~andi_ng, there rem~in important limits to the principle of 
openne~s. While at first SI~~t the exclusiOn of the Court of Justice and the Court 
of ~uditors from the provi~I_ons on transparency does not appear likely to harm 
the mterests of Europ~an Citizens, t~e same cannot be said of the absence of any 
refere~ce to the mynad of committees that assist the Commission and the 
C~unc1l or to the n_e':"'lY established European agencies. True, these bodies 
~nJ~Y ~o formal dec~swn-~aking power. Yet, decisions adopted by European 
mstltutwns. are. notonously mfluenced ~y their deliberations, particularly when 
complex scientific assessments are reqmred. It would therefore be important for 
m~erested p~rties to be granted access to the documents which are consulted in 
~~Is _co~text m or?~r to be able to make representations to the competent bodies. 
Sirrnlarly, retan~mg the reference to documents rather than to information is 
to be regretted as It enable European institutions to reject requests in which the 
relevant documents are not clearly identified. 75 
. Be that as it may, the changes brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
provided they are duly _implemented, may emerge in the future as a significan~ 
step towards the adoptiOn of a leg~l framework enabling the development at 
~uropean level of a fo~ ~f plurahst democracy, which allows the variety of 
mtere~ts affected by declSlons of the European institutions to be heard. As 
~lurahst. appro~c.hes tend to attach more importance to the possibility of 
mfluencmg declSlon-.~akers than to the ~ontrol of people's representatives, the 
absence o~ any p_rovlSlon for open meetmgs of the Council when it acts as a 
legi~lator IS less hkely to be resented as a major handicap than it is in the classic 
parliamentary !llodel: _In other words, the Amsterdam provisions on 
tra~sparency, with their mnovatwns as well as their omissions, appear closer to 
basic tenets of the regulatory model than to the parliamentary one. 
2.2.3. Subsidiarity 
The demarcati?n ?f the respective competences of central institutions and of the 
component umts 1s_a problem common _to all divide? po:vers_ systems, including 
the European Umon. Why, then, discuss subsidtanty m relation to the 
regulatory model? 
. . The reasons fo~ thi~ are to be found in the way that the subsidiarity 
pnncti?le has bee~ de~med m the EC Trea~y: A_s is ~own, the second paragraph 
of Article 3b, whtch mtroduc~d the subsidtanty pnnciple, does not define the 
compe_tences of the Comm~mty: the demarc_ation is operated by other Treaty 
provisiOns, at the top of whtch appears the prmctple of attributed powers. 76 The 
74 
Dehousse, Joerges, Majone, Snyder and Everson, Europe after 1992: New Regulatorv Strategies 
Florence: EUI Working Paper LAW 92/31, 1992, 29-31. - ' 
75 
See ,~urtin,_ "Betwixt and Between: Democracy and Transparency in the Governance of the European 
~mon , m Wmter et al., Supra note 22, 95-121 at 108. 
Article 3b, first paragraph. This point has been underlined quite clearly in the conclusions of the 
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primary aim of the subsidiarity principle appears to be to regulate the use made 
by the Community of the (non-exclusive) competences it enjoys by virtue of the 
Treaty. To this effect, the Treaty has defined a twofold subsidiarity test, which 
combines elements of effectiveness and efficiency.77 While there has been 
intense discussion on the usefulness of such criteria in the post-Maastricht 
years, these elements are recalled here merely to stress one point: namely that 
this vision of subsidiarity is more consonant with a vision of the European 
Community as a special-purpose organization, where the way institutions use 
their power is governed by more or less precise guidelines, rather than with a 
"classical" problem of demarcation of the respective competences of the centre 
and the periphery in a a two-tiered system. 
This view is reinforced by the analysis of the "Protocol on subsidiarity 
and proportionality" of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The reflection group had 
already indicated that it would be useful to adopt a number of guidelines to give 
flesh to the somewhat vague criteria laid down in Article 3b. In the flood of 
literature that has been devoted to the subsidiarity principle, two main avenues 
have been identified for its implementation: firstly a substantive one, the 
primary objective of which is to define as precisely as possible the conditions 
which should be met be met for the Community to act and the ways in which its 
action should be tailored to avoid undue interference with Member States' 
prerogatives, and secondly a procedural one, laying down the steps which must 
be taken by the institutions in undertaking their subsidiarity assessments. 
The Amsterdam Protocol trie·s to develop these two approaches in a 
parallel fashion. It lays down substantive guidelines as well as procedural 
requirements, which are intended to compel European institutions to address the 
subsidiarity issue at all levels of the legislative procedure, from the 
Commission's proposals (Art. 4) to the dialogue between the European 
Parliament and the Council (Articles 11 and 12). 
Having said this, it must however be recognized that the Protocol fails to 
add anything to what had been agreed at the European Councils of Birmingham 
and Edinburgh in 1992 or what was set down in the Interinstitutional 
Agreement of 28 October 1993 between the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Cornrnission.78 The substantive guidelines, such as the need to consider 
the implications of a lack of Community action or the preference to be given to 
directives, reproduce those that were agreed at the Edinburgh European 
Edinburgh European Council: "The principle of subsidiarity does not relate to and cannot call into 
question the powers conferred on the European Community by the Treaty as interpreted by the Court. It 
provides a guide as to how those powers are to be exercized at the Community level ... " (Bull. EC 12-
92, at 13). 
77 This point is developed in my work "Community competences: Are there Limits to Growth?" in R. 
Dehousse (ed.), Europe after Maastricht, supra note 4 at 109-112. 
78 The Agreement has been reproduced in Europe Documents n° 18157 of 4 November 1993. 
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Council.79 Similarly, on the procedural front, the obligation for the Commission 
to justify that its proposals respect the subsidiarity principle was already present 
in the Interinstitutional Agreement (articles 11.1 and II.2). Likewise, article 11 
of the Protocol, which requires the Parliament and the Council to control the 
compatibility of Commission proposals with the subsidiarity principle, 
reiterates (although in a slightly different language) what had been stated in 
article II.4 of the Agreement. 
Here again, the main innovation is of a qualitative, rather than 
substantive, nature. According to article 239 of the EC Treaty, protocols "form 
an integral part" of the Treaty, and therefore enjoy binding force, unlike 
interinstitutional agreements which are generally regarded as "soft law" 
instruments. 80 Thus, prior to the Amsterdam Protocol, it was not clear whether 
the failure of the Commission to justify its proposals with regard to the 
subsidiarity principle could lead to the annulment of a Community act. True, 
Article 190 of the Treaty requires Community acts to be motivated and the 
Court of Justice has read this provision, combined with article 3b, as requiring a 
statement of the reasons which had led to Community action. 81 This, however, 
only applies to the final version of the legislative instrument, and not to the 
interim position adopted by the institutions. 
The fact that procedural requirements have been enshrined in a protocol 
therefore appears to give them added value. The drafters of the Protocol seem to 
hope that this enhanced proceduralization will ensure that subsidiarity matters 
be duly addressed in the deliberations of the institutions. Whether modifications 
of this calibre will bring about a radical change in the legislative policy of the 
institutions is another matter... 
79 Article 6 of the Protocol, which reflects points 1.18 and 19 of the guidelines agreed at the Edinburgh 
European Council. See Bull. EC 12-92, at 14-15. 
80 Snyder, "Interinstitutional Agreements: Forms and Constitutional Limitations" in Gerd Winter (ed.), 
Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective (Nomos, 
Baden-Baden (1996), pp 453-466. 
81 Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, judgment of 13 May 1997, not yet reported. 
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3. Conclusion: An Unstable Equilibrium 
3.1. The Ambiguity of the Amsterdam Treaty 
Although the above analysis has identified greater coherence than one might 
have thought in the institutional reforms introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, 
that consistency remains characterized by a fundamental ambiguity. 
On the one hand, the Treaty has in many ways confirmed the option for 
the parliamentary model made six years earlier in Maastricht. The main 
elements of the model are twofold: a bicameral legislature, reflecting the dual 
legitimacy of the Union, and an executive whose appointment and whose term 
of office depend on the support of a majority in the lower house. These are 
features which are common to all political systems that seek to combine 
federalism and a form of parliamentary government. 
True, the evolution towards this model is not yet complete. Both the 
Commission and the Parliament remain confined to a secondary role in the 
intergovernmental pillars, even if their position has been marginally improved. 
The extension of qualified majority voting has been limited. In spite of the 
warning of the Court of Justice, which had stressed that the unanimity within 
the Council of Ministers is incompatible with an active parliamentary 
contribution to the legislative procedure,82 co-decision has been introduced in 
areas where unanimity was retained. 83 In other areas, qualified majority has 
been instituted without a corrollary increase in the Rowers of the European 
Parliament, whose role remains one of consultation. ~ Last but not least, the 
current weakness of European political parties has so far prevented the 
emergence of a form of party government similar to that which exists in many 
Western European states. The investiture of Mr. Santer has shown that when 
national parties choose to flex their muscles, their will can prevail over that of 
EP party groups.85 This notwithstanding, as regards the relationships between 
the Parliament and the executive, which is after all the cornerstone of 
parliamentary government, the legal framework which is now in place is typical 
of a parliamentary system. A change in the behaviour of political parties might 
therefore bring about a complete crystallization of the model without any 
modification of the Community's "formal constitution". 
On the other hand, although the parliamentary system remains by far the 
dominant paradigm in the discourse on the reform of European institutions, the 
82 Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council [Titanium Dioxide], [1991] ECR I-2867. 
83 Articles Sa (2), 51 and 57 (2). 
84 See e.g. Articles 130 o (establishment of joint undertakings in the framework of research policy) or 
109 q (employment policy guidelines). 
85 Hix, "Executive Selection in the European Union: A Critical Reflection on the Commission President 
Investiture Process", paper presented at the seminar of the IPSA Research Committee on European 
Unification, Brussels, 10-12 July 1997. 
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last decade has witnessed a gradual emergence of issues and instruments which 
do not correspond to the parliamentary tradition. Unlike the parliamentary 
approach, the growing involvement of the European Community in the field of 
risk regulation is not motivated by a quest for more legitimacy, but rather by 
functional concerns, such as the need to reconcile market integration and a 
number of complex issues that beset modem societies. We have seen that some 
of the basic tenets of the parliamentary model are ill-adapted to deal with these 
new tasks. Parliamentary control over the executive and (indirectly) over the 
bureaucracy is unavoidably limited for decisions that involve resorting to 
complex scientific evidence. Even if it were effective, representative democracy 
is likely to appear to many as an imperfect reflection of the multiplicity of 
interests that coexist in modem society. Likewise, parliamentary control over 
the day-to-day activities of the administration may become a source of 
politicization, which would undermine the credibility of regulatory structures. 
Hence a growing interest for alternative forms of legitimation that may grant 
interested parties some influence over Community decision-making processes. 
The fact that some of these concerns have found their way into the Amsterdam 
Treaty provisions on transparency, even though the regulatory model still has 
few declared supporters, appears to confirm that an evolution is under way. 
3.2. The Enlargement: Time for a Choice? 
This apparent contradiction should not be overdramatized. Even at state level, 
patterns of governance may vary immensely from area to area. Defence matters 
are generally centralized, even in countries where the separation of powers is 
traditionally emphasized; the autonomy enjoyed by central banks in the conduct 
of monetary policy is now widely accepted; social partners may exert a quasi-
legislative function for some apects of social policy, etc. Why then should one 
expect the European Union to display a greater degree of coherence? 
Yet the antagonistic aspects of the two models should not be ignored. 
Important contradictions appear at two levels: the way that public policy 
decisions are envisaged and the relationships between legislatures and the 
executive. While the parliamentary model still lays considerable emphasis on 
legislation as the key public policy instrument, risk regulation, because of its 
intrinsic complexity, cannot be achieved merely through general principles 
contained in a legislative document; it is largely a matter of administrative 
decisions. Moreover, the degree of autonomy that regulatory bodies should 
enjoy according to the regulatory model is incompatible with the parliamentary 
model which regards parliamentary control over the administration as essential. 
If this analysis is correct, the contradictions which have been noted could 
emerge even more clearly in the years to come. One should therefore expect 
that the executive function broadly speaking will become the focus of greater 
attention than in the past. Relationships between the Commission and the 
Parliament, as well as the latter's role in comitology, will be central issues in 
this context. Contrasting visions of the optimal institutional architecture should 
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therefore come to the fore. The BSE crisis might in retrospect appear as a 
milestone indicating the beginning of a new era in European public policy-
making. 
The enlargement debate may act as a catalyst in this process. S~ f~, the 
debate has largely focused on the representation of Member St~tes withm the 
Commission, with only scant attention given to the issue of relatiOns am?ng the 
various institutions. Although it was not possible to reach a comprollllse, the 
Amsterdam protocol on the enlargement contains the seeds of a future 
agreement: the larger Member State~ h~ve accept~d t~a~ each country shoul.d 
retain one commissioner and have mdicated their willingness to drop the~r 
"right" to an additional commissio~er. It has also . be~n agreed th~t this 
concession should be compensated m terms of reweightmg of votes m the 
Council of Ministers.86 What remains to be seen is essentially how this will be 
achieved. 
Although this quasi-agreement is technically questionable (the balance of 
power within the Council of Mi~isters bein~ls ~1:1ch a ~atter o.f the threshol? 
for majority decisions as of votmg powers ), It IS politically Importan.t ~s 1t 
signals a willingness to preserve the multinational ch~ac.te~ of ~he .Comlll1sswn, 
which has been an essential feature of the Commumty s mstltutwnal balance 
from the outset. Whether the enhanced control powers that the European 
Parliament enjoys over the Commission will allow the latter to retam a 
sufficient autonomy is open to question. Parliament's newly acquir~d po~ers 
could ultimately lead to a strengthening of party cleavages which llllght 
compromise another pillar of.th~ Eulsopean. Unio~'s st~bility, ~amely the ~ulti­
partisan profile of the Comlll1SSIOn. Dealmg With this q~est10n will re9mr~ a 
clearer vision of how the relationships between the executive and the legislatiVe 
should be conceived, so that whoever is placed in charge of the negotia~i?n will 
also be given the opportunity to address the tension between the two VISions of 
the European Union's institutional architecture outlined i~ this arti_cle .. However, 
can this gordian knot be cut without a debate on the ultlmate obJectlves of the 
Union? 
86 Peter Ludlow, "A View from Brussels: A Quarterly Commentary on the EU", No. 5, Brussels: CEPS, 
July 1997. . . 
87 Kirman and Widgren, "European Economic Decision-Making Pohcy : Progress or ParalySIS? 
Institutional Questions for 1996", 21 Economic Policy (1995) 421-460. . 
88 The problem has been analyzed at greater length in my work "Constitutional reform m the 
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